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Although the British army in the years after Waterloo was an authori-
tarian and largely autonomous institution, set apart from a civilian society 
which showed little interest in the welfare of the common soldier, it was 
not wholly immune to the currents of reform which coursed through 
English society in the age of philanthropy and improvement. In keeping 
with the spirit of the times, individual officers of a paternalistic disposition 
and enlightened administrators at the War Office strove as best they could 
to improve the conditions of army life. These individual reformers had 
to contend against considerable obstacles. Even modest ameliorative 
measures often elicited the hostility or scepticism of the commander-in-
chief and the senior military establishment. Their traditional, disparaging 
view of the rank and file as shiftless, brutish degenerates, and their narrow 
preoccupation with discipline, led them to doubt the wisdom or necessity 
of reforms which might only stimulate dissatisfaction and insubordination. 
At the same time, the cumbersome system of army administration, with its 
paralysing division of responsibilities among several competing depart-
ments, stultified concerted action and gave sufficient independent authority 
to the military men at the Horse Guards to thwart or delay any policies 
they disliked. The material and moral improvements in army life during 
the decades between Waterloo and the Crimea therefore represented 
occasional, hard-won victories in a continuous struggle by individual re-
formers of diverse persuasions against the combined forces of military 
traditionalism and bureaucratic inertia. These conflicting pressures and 
cross-currents are aptly illustrated by the campaign to establish regimental 
savings banks. 1 
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Since the early years of the nineteenth century savings banks had be-
come a fashionable humanitarian cause and had sprung up throughout Bri-
tain as a result of the pioneering activities of such agencies as the Society 
for Bettering the Condition of the Poor, founded by Sir Thomas Bernard 
in 1796, Priscilla Wakefield's Tottenham Benefit Bank of 1804, and the 
Reverend Henry Duncan's Rothwell Savings Bank of 1810 in Dumfries-
shire. By the mid-1810s these institutions had generated such a wide-
spread and popular movement that the demand for statutory control, urged 
by members of parliament like George Rose, led to a series of regulatory 
acts, the first of which was passed in 1817. 2 Because locally based savings 
banks could not cater satisfactorily to the needs and habits of serving 
soldiers who had no fixed abode and might be stationed overseas for many 
years at a time, proposals for the creation of special regimental savings 
schemes were periodically pressed on the attention of the military authori-
ties. 
Their advocates maintained that individual soldiers and the army at 
large would benefit from the provision of better facilities for depositing 
daily or weekly pay. Rank and file might thus set aside money for the 
subsequent augmentation of pensions or for the more immediate use of 
wives and families, who were so often left without adequate financial 
support. The opportunity to save money might also reduce the vast sums 
frittered away on liquor and so curtail the incidence of drunkenness among 
the troops, a major cause of sickness and indiscipline which severe punish-
ments seemed unable to check. A thrifty soldiery with frugal habits, so the 
argument ran, would be a sober, contented, well-behaved soldiery. "As 
long as a soldier has money in deposit, either with his officer or else-
where", commented Major Thomas Wingfield of the 32nd Foot, "he is a 
well-conducted man. A soldier at first often spends his money in drink 
because he does not know yvhat to do with it, and acquires a habit which 
soon becomes a necessity to him." 3 With the insecurity of spare cash 
about the person and no place of safety for lodging it in barrack-rooms, 
servicemen disposed of it as soon as possible on alcoholic refreshment. 4 
Particularly while troops continued to be paid daily, as was the practice 
in many regiments, the Reverend Henry Stuart, chaplain to the Aberdeen 
garrison, pointed out that the men had "loose money in their pockets, 
never amounting to so much as to buy anything useful or worth while to 
save". But if a soldier could receive his pay weekly and be encouraged to 
deposit part of it in a savings bank, Major Robert Brookes of the 69th 
Regiment believed that this would teach him "to set a high value on money, 
and not to regard it (as is too generally the case) as the means of affording 
him temporary gratification in the indulgence of excess". 5 
2 See Henry 0. HORNE, A History of Savings Banks (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1949); GosDEN, Self-Help , pp. 207-58; A. FISHLOW, "The Trustee Savings 
Banks, 1817-1861", Journal of Economic History, XXI (March 1961): 27-39. 
3 GREAT BRITAIN, Parliamentary Papers (Commons) (hereafter Par/. Papers) 1836 
(59) XXII, Royal Commission on Military Punishments, Minutes of Evidence, p. 454. 
4 Letters from "O.C. Proteus" and "H.B.", 13 February 1835, United Service 
Magazine, XV (1834, Part 2): 413-14; and XVII (1835, Part 1): 403-6. 
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In a number of regiments paternalistic, humanitarian, or enterprising 
officers took matters into their own hands. As in the contemporaneous 
establishment of regimental benevolent societies and libraries for rank and 
file, several savings schemes were quietly launched without official sanc-
tion and probably in most cases without official knowledge. Evidence of 
particular ventures is scanty, but one documented case concerns the depot 
at Maidstone of four cavalry regiments serving in India. Here one of the 
corps started a savings bank in 1823 and under the patronage of the com-
manding officer, Sir John Browne, the scheme was gradually extended to 
the other companies. The troops were paid weekly, on the day before the 
savings bank held its meeting to accept from pay-sergeants the deposits 
of individual soldiers in each corps . Although a permanent depot in Britain 
had some advantage over ' a marching regiment serving overseas when it 
came to depositing these savings at interest in British banks and · securities, 
the composition of this recruiting depot might have been considered un-
favourable to the success of such an enterprise, since it consisted principally 
of young Irish recruits on their way to India and subject to the expensive 
outlay on their initial equipment. Nevertheless, the scheme prospered at 
first and within a year deposits amounted to over£ 1,000. Notwithstanding 
many difficulties, including the sneers and gibes of unsympathetic officers, 
one participant later claimed that drunkenness thereafter became less com-
mon at Maidstone and the barrack canteen less thronged with improvident 
tipplers. 6 No doubt similar experiments were made in other battalions, 
like the one instituted in the 80th Foot in 1833 which amassed savings of 
£200 by the end of the year, or the later highly successful venture of the 
93rd Highlanders. 7 Nevertheless, the products of individual initiative 
were unlikely to prosper for any length of time or be widely imitated 
throughout the army until spasmodic philanthropic endeavours managed 
to recruit the decisive backing of the army authorities. 
From the time when proposals for facilitating soldiers' savings were 
first advanced after the Napoleonic Wars, the commander-in-chief and 
senior military officers displayed an adamant opposition to all such 
schemes. In 1816 Paymaster John Fairfowl of the 91st Regiment recom-
mended to the War Office a plan whereby soldiers serving abroad might 
remit money home and deposit it at interest through the medium of regi-
mental accounts. Lord Palmerston, as secretary at war, simply referred 
the scheme to the commander-in-chief, the Duke of York, and subsequently 
allowed the matter to drop when he expressed an adverse opinion. Self-
denial , thrift and prudential habits were not expected of the average 
soldier, nor were they to be encouraged. In response to further representa-
tions from individual correspondents, however, Palmerston attempted in 
1822 to improve the facilities which already existed for troops stationed 
overseas to transmit small sums of money through regimental accounts 
6 Letter from "Philo-Miles", United Service Magazine , XX (1836, Part 1) : 112-13. 
1 Letter from " E .H." , United Service Magazine, XVIII (1835 , Part 2) : 254-56 ; 
Arthur to Eden, 24 August 1840, Arthur to Jackson, 9 January 1841 , and Spark to Foster, 
5 March 1841, with enclosures, in C. R. SANDERSON, ed., The Arthur Papers, 3 vols (To-
ronto: Toronto Public Libraries, 1959), Ill : 115, 235, and 359-63. 
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for the support of families and relatives in Britain. Although considerable 
funds were sent home by this means and paid by regimental agents in 
Britain to the parties involved without loss or expense, there was as yet 
no question of soliciting savings and paying interest on them. 8 Then in 
1823 Captain Burt wrote to the War Office from the West Indies with a 
plan which would permit these remittances from the savings of pay to be 
deposited at interest in British banks. This proposal was referred to a 
specially convened Board of Officers which reported unfavourably. 9 
This predictable decision by no means settled the matter and indi-
vidual officers continued to bring it to official notice. In 1827 Lieutenant-
Colonel Henry Oglander of the 26th Foot typically urged on the secretary 
at war the benefits likely to accrue from savings schemes specifically de-
signed to accommodate the habits of soldiers whose changes of residence 
and foreign service precluded their taking advantage of existing institutions 
open to civilians. He sought to assuage official fears by pointedly arguing 
tha:t a soldier 
would thus be made a better member of society without becoming too indepen-
dent of his profession, from which, if in a few cases (and I feel assured they 
would be rare), his mind should be alienated, such individuals might then be 
allowed to purchase their discharge. For the general course however, as it 
would tend to the respectability, welfare and comfort of their class, they would 
be grateful for the benefit, and thus become more attached to their profession. 10 
Oglander's letter was passed on to the commander-in-chief, then the Duke 
of Wellington, who responded with the time-honoured objection against 
creating a thrifty soldiery. If Tommy Atkins had money to save, this could 
only mean that his pay was excessive, and its reduction would promote 
greater frugality than would the creation of complicated administrative 
and financial arrangements for savings which no one would use. "Has the 
Soldier in the Army more Pay than he requires?", Lord Fitzroy Somerset, 
military secretary to the commander-in-chief, sceptically enquired in 1827. 
"If he has the Soldier's pay ought to be lowered, not to those now in the 
service, but to others enlisted hereafter. I don't think it desireable to en-
courage our Soldiers to become over thrifty.'' 11 
Several commanding officers, untouched by philanthropic influences, 
agreed with their superiors that saving money was incompatible with de-
dicated professionalism, at least in the case of rank and file. The soldier, 
observed one traditionalist, "is the most perfect who spends his money, 
8 Public Record Office, War Office Records (hereafter WO), WO 43/317, Circular 
Letters, Nos 466 and 586, 30 April 1822 and January 1827, referred to in Anderson's 
minute, 20 May 1831. 
9 WO 3/73, Torrens to Calvert, 28 February 1823 ; WO 43/475, Hill to Howick, 6 
November 1835; WO 43/704, Hill to Howick, 8 June 1838. 
10 WO 43/317, Oglander to Palmerston, I August 1827. Oglander was known as " a 
father" to his regiment, such was his concern for the welfare of the rank and file. See 
Mrs A. S. H. MOUNTAIN, ed., Memoirs and Letters of the late Col. A . S. H. Mountain 
(London: John Murray, 1858), pp. 141-42, 215, and 222. On the paternal interest of officers 
in their men, see Hew STRACHAN, "The Early Victorian Army and the Nineteenth-Century 
Revolution in Government", English Historical Review, XCV (October 1980): 798-801. 
11 WO 43/317, Somerset to Lukin, 5 September 1827. 
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and does not look beyond the day". Men who accumulated savings might 
be tempted to squander them on periodic bacchanalia or expend them in 
the purchase of civilian clothing and other requisites for aiding desertion 
from their regiments. In any case, savers would become discontented with 
army life, "cease to regard Soldiering as the main object, and lose that 
smartness and Express, De, Corps [sic], which is considered so desirable." 
Resort to drink, by the same token, offered a congenial antidote to boring 
routine and a safety valve for the release of dissatisfaction which might 
otherwise take more disruptive forms of protest. Moreover, the necessary 
arrangements for administering a savings bank and giving depositors some 
voice in its management would "create a new influence in Regiments, 
which would require much Scrutiny; Canvassing, & Elections, are things 
which ought to be admitted with great circumspection into anything like 
Military bodies.'' 12 The formation of societies within regiments, whether 
for savings, temperance or charitable purposes, was ariathema to senior 
officers in the Wellingtonian army. 
Although in the matter of Oglander's proposals in 1827 Palmerston 
again deferred to the commander-in-chiefs superior judgment, depart-
mental officials at the War Office then and later expressed their positive 
disagreement with Wellington's uninformed and highly questionable opi-
nion. Certainly his references to rates of pay was a blatant red herring. 
One dissenting clerk commented in 1831 : 
Habits of Sobriety and Frugality are comparative, and the Journeyman or the 
Labourer who earns 12/- or 14/- a week will often save as much as those whose 
wages may be double. If a Soldier is a man of steady & sober Habits, it is 
obvious that he will be anxious to save something out of his Pay and so he would 
be, if his Pay should be reduced, although his Savings might be less; but the 
drunken and thriftless Soldier on the other hand would not save even if his Pay 
and allowances were doubled . 
Another official in the war department concurred with his colleague. 
I confess that notwithstanding the high military authorities against the Esta-
blishment of a Savings Bank for the Army, it strikes me as likely to be attended 
with the most beneficial results to the Service. It is generally admitted that in 
Civil life the Contributors to these Banks are found to be more sober & altoge-
ther better conducted persons than those who reckless of futurity lay by nothing 
for old age or infirmity, & there seems to be no reason to suppose that habits of 
economy can in any degree tend to injure the effectiveness of the Soldier. 13 
Official endorsement of this view and its translation into a practical meas-
ure had to await the appointment of an enlightened and determined secre-
tary at war or the additional stimulus of more urgent military or financial 
pressure. 
This necessary conjunction of forces occurred in the late 1830s and it 
did so as a result of official inquiries into the health and the discipline of 
British troops. In 1834 J. C. Herries, a Tory secretary at war, was keen to 
12 T. H. Wingfield, remarks on regulations for conducting a savings bank, 27 Jan-
uary 1841, in SANDERSON, The Arthur Papers, III: 280-81. 
13 WO 43/317, Anderson's minute and unsigned War Office minute, 20 May 1831. 
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cut expenditure on military hospitals in India and on the despatch of reliefs 
from England to replace the steady stream of invalids sent home. He ac-
cordingly requested Sir James McGrigor, director general of the army me-
dical department, to prepare a report on the health of the army in India and 
to suggest ways of reducing the endemic drunkenness among the troops, 
which was thought to be a potent source of illness and indiscipline. The fol-
lowing year McGrigor submitted an alarming account of the heavy toll 
inflicted on regiments serving in India by death, sickness and invaliding. 
He cited intemperance as a major cause of disease and among several 
remedies recommended the formation of savings banks, so that soldiers 
might be encouraged, or better still compelled, to deposit part of their 
pay rather than squander it on the demon, drink. 14 
Thriftiness among soldiers was at last beginning to attract official fa-
vour, at least in some quarters, not so much because it would enable rank 
and file to accumulate sums of money for providential purposes, but be-
cause it might deter them from indulging to excess the evil passion for 
liquor. 15 Traditionally, military men had contended that British soldiers, 
especially in tropical climates, required liquor to invigorate and sustain 
them. By the 1830s, however, the view was gaining ground among 
commanding officers, civilian administrators at the War Office, MPs , and 
writers on military affairs that the issue of liquor rations and the operations 
of regimental canteens were thoroughly pernicious practices. Immoderate 
drinking over many years destroyed the soldier's health, by accelerating 
early physical deterioration and increasing susceptibility to disease, as sure-
ly as it subverted discipline. Statistics could not be produced to demons-
trate the long-term effects of intemperance on health, but figures relating 
to the commission of military crimes suggested that about a quarter of of-
fences heard by courts martial in the 1830s concerned habitual drunkenness 
or drunkenness on duty. 16 
Meanwhile the whole controversial question of military punishments 
was under investigation by a royal commission appointed by the Whig mi-
nistry in 1834 in order to allay mounting criticism in parliament and in the 
press of the practice of flogging in the army. Its report two years later 
produced a moderate defence of corporal punishment as essential to mili-
tary discipline and efficiency, at least in the present unregenerate state of 
the British army, but endorsed the recent tendency of courts martial to 
resort to alternative punishments such as imprisonment, hard labour and 
solitary confinement. As an indication of this contemporary trend, between 
14 WO 43/475 , McGrigor's report, encl. in McGrigor to Sulivan, 25 July 1835. For 
McGrigor and the operations of his department, see Richard L. BLANCO, Wellington's Sur-
geon General: Sir James MeG rigor (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1974) ; Neil 
CANTLIE, A History of the Army Medical Department, 2 vols (Edinburgh: Churchill Living-
stone, 1974), I. The government of Bengal had instituted a general savings bank for soldiers 
in 1833 . WO 4/266, Sulivan to Board of Control, 18 November 1843 . 
15 University of Durham, Grey Papers (hereafter GP), GP/War Office, PI , Raper's 
minute , 11 April 1836. 
16 Pari. Papers 1838 (584) XXXVII, Returns Relating to Army Punishments in 
Britain and Ireland, 1831-8. 
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1826 and 1834 (when the total establishment of the British army fell from 
111,058 to 103,063) sentences of corporal punishment declined from 2,722 
to 1,057, while those involving other penalties grew from 2,653 to 8,946. 
During the same period a steep rise occurred in the commission of offences 
and consequently in the number of courts martial held, from 5,524 to 
10,212.1' This coincidence of fewer floggings and increasing delinquency 
strengthened the resolve of strict disciplinarians to retain corporal pu-
nishment for serious felonies ; but it also stimulated moderate defenders of 
. the practice, like the members of the royal commission, and cautious re-
formers to seek ways of tackling the causes of military crime. Principally, 
this meant improving conditions of service in the armed forces and offering 
positive incentives to and rewards for good behaviour. In addition to re-
commending the introduction of a scheme of good-conduct pay and badges, 
barrack libraries for non-commissioned officers and privates, and better fa-
cilities for manly sports and constructive pastimes, the commissioners sup-
ported the opinion expressed by many military officers who submitted evi-
dence that the creation of regimental savings banks would positively pro-
mote frugal, temperate and orderly habits. 
As the tone and contents of the report implied, the public campaign 
against corporal punishment in the army, as well as the decreasing resort in 
practice to this type of penalty for military crimes, induced many tradition-
alists and defenders of flogging to pay greater attention than they might 
otherwise have done to improving the moral character of the soldier. Ad-
mittedly, many of these officers were motivated less by an interest in the 
welfare of the individual soldier than by a concern for the discipline, 
efficiency, and morale of the army at large. Less drinking might produce 
fewer infractions of military regulations ; better conditions of army life 
might attract a superior type of recruit. An equally compelling considera-
tion for the authorities was that any measure which contributed towards 
lessening the considerable wastage of manpower through mortality, 
sickness, and invaliding promised pecuniary savings at a time when parlia-
mentary criticism of military expenditure was inducing a relentless search 
for economy in the army's operations. 
One possible method of achieving these practical objectives was to 
give the ordinary soldier access to those philanthropic, self-help institu-
tions which were available to, and indeed pressed upon, civilian contempo-
raries. A correspondent calling himself "Philo-Miles" warned the editor of 
the United Service Magazine in 1836 that the army must come to terms 
with the spirit of the times : 
It is impossible for any one, who has watched the workings of our military sys-
tem during the last 25 years, not to be impressed with the conviction that it is 
gradually imbibing the influence of the era in which we live, and it is the duty 
of every one to use his humble exertions to preserve intact the efficient discipline 
of the Army, by so engrafting that influence upon, that it may not paralyze and 
destroy it. 
17 Par/. Papers 1836 (59) XXII, Report of the Royal Commission on Military Punish-
ments, p. 555. 
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With this objective in mind, the writer went on to argue that military sa-
vings banks might become valuable agencies of stability and order. They 
would give 
the soldier a direct interest in the vested securities of the country: an object of 
no small moment, when the levelling spirit of the age is directly aimed to sap its 
institutions, as well as in various ways to check and lower that indispensable 
control of the Government over the soldier, without which the best army must 
soon degenerate into the most dangerous mob, and anarchy and revolution do 
their bidding.ts 
The pressures and influences which contributed towards the eventual adop-
tion in the army of such philanthropic institutions as savings banks there-
fore came from diverse, and at times unexpected, quarters and not exclusi-
vely, nor even principally, from philanthropists and humanitarians. But 
whatever the origin or motivation, it was the officers who provided the 
initiative on behalf of the men or the service, and not the rank and file who 
generated an overwhelming demand which had to be satisfied. The same 
"downwards" pressures for social reform were evident in contemporary 
civilian society, but they were wholly appropriate to a hierarchical, autho-
ritarian institution like the British army. The common soldier had little 
influence over his conditions of service and could express his dissatisfac-
tion only by resorting to unconstructive forms of protest such as intoxica-
tion, indiscipline and desertion. 
The recommendations contained in the two separate reports on the 
health of the army in India and on military punishments received a sympa-
thetic reception at the War Office because they fortuitously coincided with 
the recent appointment of Lord Howick as secretary at war in Lord Mel-
bourne's second ministry. A former under-secretary at the colonial and 
home departments, Howick came to the War Office in April 1835 with the 
reputation of being an able, energetic, if at times cantankerous, administra-
tor. Conscientious to a fault, he set about tackling the profusion of abuses 
and chronic mismanagement which he soon discovered in army administra-
tion. Although he was temperamentally something of an authoritarian when 
it came to regulating human behaviour, his generous sympathies and ge-
nuine concern to better the lot of the ordinary soldier produced between 
1835 and 1839 a broad range of ameliorative measures touching both the 
material and moral conditions of army life. An ardent believer in the vir-
tues of thrift, sobriety and self-help, Howick at once recognized the poten-
tial usefulness of savings banks in counteracting the endemic military pro-
blems of drunkenness and indiscipline, mortality and sickness. 
Howick was also gravely disturbed at the large-scale desertion which 
continually sapped the strength of regiments stationed in British North 
America. As substantial numbers of British soldiers fled each year across 
the American border, the authorities were perennially plagued by a wor-
rying, intractable problem of major proportions which was thought to jeo-
pardize severely the army's efficiency and morale in a sensitive and poten-
tially explosive theatre of operations. Moreover, military expenditure was 
18 United Service Magazine, XX (1836, Part l): Ill and 113. 
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unnecessarily increased by the cost of recruiting, training and despatching 
a stream of replacements from Britain. Howick came into office at a time 
when the deteriorating state of Anglo-Canadian relations was fast approach-
ing a crisis point and when desertion seemed to be assuming alarming 
proportions. The statistical returns indicated that in 1830 the Canada 
command suffered 142 desertions, or 4.2 percent of the average annual 
force, whereas in 1835 the 231 deserters constituted 8.5 percent of the 
force. The same two years saw desertions in the Nova Scotia command 
rise from 80 or 3.2 percent to 101 or 4.5 percent. The monthly returns also 
suggested that the proportion of escapees reunited with their regiments va-
ried erratically but was often under twenty percent and seldom over fifty 
percent, a most unsatisfactory rate of recapture. In February 1835 the se-
cretary at war complained that of the 792 soldiers who had deserted in 
British North America during the previous two and a half years, only 143 
had been apprehended. 19 
As for remedial action, Howick was instinctively sceptical of the 
efficacy of existing methods of checking desertion, which relied chiefly on 
staunch the haemorrhage of manpower; punitive deterrents would never 
other would-be offenders. The penalties traditionally favoured by the mili-
tary men at the Horse Guards, he recognized, had palpably failed to 
staunch the haemorrhage of manpower; punitive deterrents would never 
successfully counteract the seductive pull of higher wages , cheap land and 
alluring prospects in the United States. The remedy had to be sought in 
positive counter-attractions which might at least moderate the present dis-
position of soldiers to desert. More compelling inducements to remain in 
British military service had to be created by materially improving the sol-
dier's life and conditions. Among a variety of such measures, savings 
banks could play a part. Certainly men who put money by in this fashion 
would be less likely to desert the colours and forfeit their savings. 
Several officers serving in Canada agreed with this line of reasoning. 
"Whatever objections may exist against Savings Banks elsewhere", re-
marked Sir George Arthur, lieutenant-governor of Upper Canada and an 
experienced military officer, "in Canada they possess a strong recommen-
dation, and, under good arrangements, carefully observed, any possible 
bad consequences may be avoided. If the Soldiers can be prevailed upon to 
lay up a portion of their Pay, - it will operate as a powerful counteracting 
influence against desertion." "If Savings Banks could be established in 
every Battalion", avowed another soldier stationed in Canada, "under 
such a superintendence of the Commanding, and other, Officers, so as to 
prevent the unmilitary assembling for debate of NonCommissioned 
Officers and Privates, there is little doubt that the Drunkenness and Deser-
tion would receive the greatest check." 20 As an example of what might be 
19 WO 17/1534 and 1539, monthly returns, 1830 and 1835, for the Canada command, 
and WO 17/2377 and 2382, for the Nova Scotia command ; WO 43/474/1, draft War Office to 
Hill, February 1835. 
20 Arthur to Eden, 24 August 1840, and anonymous minute for Arthur, 18 March 
1841 , in SANDERSON , The Arthur Papers, III : 115 and 397 ; Public Archives of Canada, 
British Military Records, RG8 , Vol. 1277, 191, Colborne to Somerset, 11 May 1837. 
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achieved, Major-General Sir Colin Campbell, lieutenant-governor of Nova 
Scotia, pointed to the American experience. 
Savings banks should be established. The Americans have established them on a 
compulsory principle, at their frontier posts. The saving is there paid to the 
soldier at the end of his term of service, which enables him to locate himself 
comfortably upon the grant of land given to him by the government. He has thus 
an incentive to good conduct, and something certain to look forward to. A strong 
connecting link is thus formed between him and the government he serves, and 
he has the best and most powerful of restraints, that of his own interest, placed 
upon his evil passions .2t 
In the pursuit of this particular innovation, and of a reformist policy 
in general, Howick had to contend, not only with the ingrained prejudiCes 
and professional misgivings of the commander-in-chief, Lord Hill, but also 
with a fragmented, unwieldy administrative · structure. The handling of 
army affairs was injuriously divided among the rival bureaucracies of the 
War Office, Colonial Office, Home Office, Treasury, Horse Guards, and 
Ordnance, each intent on defending against encroachment its own parti-
cular responsibilities. Many of Howick's projected schemes, including that 
of savings banks, had to struggle against the scepticism, carping criticism, 
or outright hostility of other departments, which could seldom be ignored, 
and which the secretary at war lacked the necessary authority to override. 
Often Howick could do no more than urge, cajole, or protest in the hope of 
converting or wearing down the stamina of opponents and doubters. Since 
these tactics frequently failed, he had to be content with isolated triumphs, 
the foundation of military savings banks being one of these rare victories. 
When the recommendations contained in McGrigor' s report on the 
health of British troops in India were under consideration in the autumn of 
1835, Howick at first made little headway against the persistent apathy of 
the commander-in-chief. In .a distinctly unhelpful response, Hill despaired 
of ever stimulating self-denial or prudential habits among the rank and file. 
Intoxication and its evil effects, he averred, could be countered only by 
strict discipline and the vigilance of commanding officers. He offered no 
comment on McGrigor's suggestions that savings banks should be formed, 
and that soldiers undergoing treatment in hospital should be compelled to 
deposit their pay in them, in order that patients might not accumulate funds 
which could on discharge be spent indulging the bad habits responsible for 
sending them to hospital in the first place. Howick found the commander-
in-chiefs indifference discouraging: "I am afraid this letter shews that 
there is no disposition at Head Quarters to take this subject up in earnest, 
& if not it is in vain to endeavour to originate effective improvements in the 
W. 0." The secretary at war's further attempt to arouse Hill's interest in 
the specific question of savings banks elicited a decidedly negative res-
ponse: such institutions were undesirable and unnecessary in the Wel-
lingtonian army. "This confirms the impression I had before received", 
Howick despondently noted, "that Lord Hill does not think it worth while 
taking this subject up with a view to any practical measures. It is therefore 
21 Par/. Papers 1836 (59) XXII, Royal Commission on Military Punishments, Minutes 
of Evidence, p. 450. 
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in vain pursuing the correspondence any further.'' 22 Being relatively new 
to office and uncertain of continuing as a member of Melbourne's ministry 
in the autumn of 1835,23 Howick at this time shunned a departmental wran-
gle with the Horse Guards, which pursuit of the topic would have entailed, 
and which later in his term of office he would not have so readily eschew-
ed. 
During the next year or two Howick had other, weightier matters to 
command his attention. Above all he was preoccupied with a protracted, 
and finally abortive, effort to secure a reorganization of army administra-
tion. Even the report of the royal commission on military punishments in 
1836, in other respects a major determinant of his unfolding reformist pro-
gramme, failed to revive the dormant question of savings banks. It did not 
again come to the fore until the House of Commons in March 1838 debated 
rewards and punishments in the army on the committee stage of the mutiny 
bill. Several MPs, anxious to diminish still further the resort to flogging, 
urged the introduction of ameliorative measures to improve the conditions 
of service, including the creation of regimental savings banks. 24 In the light 
of this debate Hawick again suggested to Hill that, without the esta-
blishment of new, complicated administrative arrangements, a suitable 
method of receiving small deposits from military savers should be sought 
through an extension of the facilities which currently existed for soldiers 
serving overseas to remit money home. 25 On this occasion, perhaps unex-
pectedly, Hill did not press his earlier objections. Although he may not 
have grasped the full implications of Hawick's proposal, he now admitted 
that the army might benefit from such a scheme. His one stipulation was 
that it must take account of soldiers' habits and the interior economy of 
regiments, whereby the management of pecuniary affairs was customarily 
left in the hands of commanding officers, captains of companies, and regi-
mental paymasters. 26 
This hurdle surmounted more easily than he could have anticipated, 
Hawick requested his departmental officials to draft a simple plan based on 
the principle that sums of money deposited by individual soldiers with 
paymasters should be applied to regimental expenditure, the issue of funds 
from the War Office being proportionally reduced and the exchequer made 
liable for the reimbursement of savings and the payment of interest on 
them. The bare bones of this scheme were subsequently fleshed out in a 
draft warrant. The rate of interest was set at 3 3/4 percent, as against the 
2 1/2 percent regular savings banks in Britain were permitted by law to pay 
depositors, a recognition of the severity of military service abroad and an 
added attraction to savers. A sum to cover the cost of interest payments 
22 WO 43/475, Hill to Howick, 18 September 1835, Howick's minute , undated , on 
Sulivan's minute, 23 September 1835, and Howick's minute, 16 November 1835, on Hill to 
Howick, 6 November 1835. 
23 GP/3rd Earl Grey , Howick's Journal, 15 December 1835. 
2
• GREAT BRITAIN, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 3rd series, XLI, 
26 March 1838, cots 1249-80. 
25 GP/War Office, P2, draft Howick to Hill, undated [1838]. 
26 WO 43/704, Hill to Howick, 8 June 1838. 
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would be included in the army estimates. Some difference of opinion arose 
over the soldiers' right to withdraw deposits on demand, except when 
finally discharged from the army. It was eventually decided to allow with-
drawals at one week's notice because Howick wanted to avoid restrictions 
which might discourage depositors, and he rejected Hill's pessimistic ar-
gument that the rank and file would simply use the banks to save up their 
pennies for the occasional debauch. 27 
If the commander-in-chief was now pleasingly accommodating, the 
Treasury was not. In a spirited exchange of correspondence a host of 
financial, legal and administrative objections were raised by Treasury 
officials. They condemned the draft warrant for being badly drawn by 
someone who evidently did not understand the subject, legally inoperative 
without the sanction of an act of parliament, and impracticable without any 
funds accruing from the productive investment of the money to pay the 
exorbitant rate of interest on an unlimited volume of deposits. Moreover, 
inadequate security was offered depositors for regaining their money; a 
guarantee which savings banks in Britain provided by investing their funds 
in public securities. As a more feasible alternative, the Treasury suggested 
an enlargement of existing arrangements so that regimental officers would 
in effect become local managers of overseas branches of British savings 
banks. 28 
For several months, with mounting anger and desperation, Howick 
painstakingly demolished objections levelled by senior Treasury officials to 
a scheme which, he felt, they had clearly failed to comprehend. He de-
monstrated the patent absurdity of constituting transient military officers 
trustees and responsible agents of domestic savings banks. Because the 
operations of these banks could not be suitably adapted to the needs of the 
army, especially for troops stationed abroad, he repeatedly urged the ex-
pediency of making special arrangements, though he offered to place a 
limit of £10 on individual deposits and accept a lower rate of interest. 
Contrary to what the Treasury asserted, he stoutly maintained that present 
laws afforded adequate authority for introducing the plan and sufficient se-
curity for depositors and the public alike. If such a manifestly valuable 
experiment was not sanctioned, Howick pointedly warned, the chancellor 
of the exchequer would have to assume the whole odious responsibility for 
the decision and face unaided the predictable barrage of parliamentary cri-
ticism. The latter would do well to think carefully, the unrepentant secre-
tary at war lectured his cabinet colleague, before he finally rejected a plan, 
endorsed by the highest military ~pthorities, to which great importance was 
attached by those MPs who supported the ministry in retaining corporal 
27 Ibid., Howick's minute, 16 June 1838, and War Office minute, 16 July 1838 ; 
GP/War Office, P3-4 and P7, Howick to Hill, 28 November 1838, and Hill to Howick, 12 
and 26 December 1838; WO 4/730, Howick to Baring, 29 December 1838. 
28 GP/War Office, PS-9 and Pll-12, Baring to Howick, 31 December 1838, and 1 
January 1839, and Rice to Howick, 12 and 26 January 1839; WO 43/704, Baring to Howick, 
17 January 1839. 
MILITARY SAVINGS BANKS 335 
punishment on the ground of necessity but were anxious to diminish as 
much as possible the occasions for having recourse to it. 29 
It is unlikely that these warnings and threats from the irascible, pug-
nacious Howick aroused much apprehension or carried much weight with-
in the Treasury, where they had been heard so often before. Owing to the 
welter of controversies which racked relations between Howick and the 
Treasury during 1839, nothing further was achieved before he resigned 
from office in high dudgeon in August that year. Nevertheless, his succes-
sor at the War Office, Thomas Babington Macaulay, with more tactful de-
partmental diplomacy, persevered with the scheme, limiting deposits to 
£30 a year and a total of £200 per man but maintaining an interest rate of 
3 3/4 percent. A sum of £500 was duly earmarked in the army estimates for 
1841 to cover the cost of interest payments, but still the Treasury quibbled 
over the rate proposed. It was left to the next secretary at war, Sir Henry 
Hardinge, to carry this remaining point, so that finally in 1842 an act was 
passed authorizing the establishment of military savings banks. 30 
To the last the senior military command remained sceptical of the 
wisdom and usefulness of the venture. Their profound misgivings contin-
ued to be voiced as late as 1841, when word reached the Horse Guards 
that the 93rd Highland Regiment, then stationed in British North Amer-
ica, had jumped the gun and launched a savings bank on the eve of im-
pending imperial legislation. Begun in January 1840 and unsupervised by 
officers, it was run by an annually elected committee of twelve non-
commissioned officers and privates, who invested the funds in provincial 
bank stock. Within the first year £605 had been deposited by 121 partici-
pants , the individual amounts ranging from the minimum of one shilling to 
£62 by the master tailor. The withdrawal of savings at three months ' notice 
was permitted only for discharge from the army , transfers to other regi-
ments , or by special sanction from the commanding officer and the commit-
tee who were to decide whether the money would be properly employed 
for constructive purposes. 31 When the Horse Guards heard of this prema-
ture initiative taken by the 93rd , the commander-in-chief felt compelled to 
express his regret: 
It might have been a question with his Lordship , if reference had previously 
been made to him, whether it would have been desirable to authorize an In-
stitution not recognized by the Regulations of the Service, but ... he should feel 
great reluctance in disturbing an arrangement which it would appear is likely 
to lead to many advantages. 
29 GP/War Office , Pl3-14 and P17, Howick to Rice, 26 January 1839, Rice to Howick, 
1 February 1839, and Howick to Rice , 4 February 1839 ; WO 43/704, draft War Office to 
Treasury , undated [1839] ; WO 4/730, Howick to Baring , 31 January 1839. 
30 Ibid., Macaulay to Gordon , 4 April 1840, and Macaulay to Trevelyan, 5 April 
1841 ; WO 4/731, Hardinge to Trevelyan, 23 April 1842, and Hardinge to Clerk, 22 June 
1842 ; WO 43/704, War Office minutes, undated [1840] , Treasury minute, 30 October 1840, 
and Circular No. 918 , 1 October 1843 ; An Act to establish Military Savings Banks, 1842, 
5 & 6 Vic. cap . 71. 
3 1 Arthur to Eden , 24 August 1840, Arthur to Jackson, 9 January 1841, and Spark 
to Foster, 5 March 1841 , with enclosures , in SANDERSON, Th e Arthur Papers , III: 115, 
235 , and 359-63. 
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With the imperial act in the offing, nothing remained but to acquiesce. 
"Lord Hill is unwilling to remark on this occasion at any length, as to the 
objection which might probably be advanced against so large a body of 
Men as the Depositors in the Savings Banks of this Corps would seem to 
consist being allowed to assemble, even with the avowed purpose mention-
ed." 32 
Despite these qualms, which many commanding officers must have 
shared, virtually all battalions in the British army at home and abroad 
had formed savings banks within a few years of the passage of the enabling 
legislation, and in 1846 the East India Company extended the arrangements 
to British soldiers and sepoys in India. 33 Although the number of par-
ticipants who were able or inclined to set aside savings out of their 
meagre pay remained relatively small, the banks met a need and deposits 
steadily increased. In 1845, 3,414 soldiers had saved £34,683 and by 
1851, 9,575 depositors had amassed £121,188. 34 In 1849, after more 
than two decades of intermittent discussion, the funds of regimental 
benevolent societies, which the military authorities had been obliged 
to tolerate because of the legislative protection given to the formation 
of friendly societies, were finally merged into the savings banks for 
greater security and regularity in their operations. 35 After several 
amendments to the original act, by 1865 the fund held by the War Office 
with the national debt commissioners amounted to over £250,000. 36 By that 
time, however, the Post Office savings bank, which Gladstone had started 
in 1861, was offering an alternative form of deposit for small savers. 37 
Its facilities proved to be attractive to soldiers as well as civilians and 
eventually in 1884 the authorities decided to discontinue military savings 
banks on the ground that they had outlived their usefulness. 38 
It is impossible to ascertain whether the introduction of this pru-
dential institution into the British army had a discernible impact, as was 
intended, on the pattern of soldiers' behaviour or on the particular prob-
lems of drunkenness and discipline. Even with respect to desertion in 
British North America, the sharp reduction in the number of men fleeing 
32 WO 3/96, Macdonald to Jackson, 20 February and 17 April 1841. 
JJ WO 4/266, Sulivan to Board of Control, 18 November 1843; WO 3/182, Mac-
donald to Sulivan, 2 December 1845; WO 3/103, Macdonald to Gough, 2 January 1846. 
34 Par/. Papers 1846 (173) XXVI, and 1852 (133) XXX, Amounts Deposited in 
Military Savings Banks. Many officers wanted savings to be made compulsory. See Charles 
J. NAPIER, Remarks on Military Law (London: John Murray, 1837), pp. 185-89; Henry 
MARSHALL, Military Miscellany (London: John Murray, 1846), p. 82. 
35 WO 3/184, Macdonald's memo on regimental funds, 10 July 1848; GREAT BRITAIN, 
Statutes, "An Act to dissolve Regimental Benefit Societies, and to provide for the Applica-
tion of the Funds of such Societies, and of Regimental Charitable Funds, 1849", 12 & 13 
Vic. cap. 71. 
36 Par/. Papers 1860 (140) XLI, Return of All Savings Banks Established, pp. 631-
35; HoRNE, A History of Savings Banks, p. 143. 
37 GREAT BRITAIN, Staflltes, "An Act to grant additional Facilities for depositing 
small Savings at Interest, with the Security of the Government for due Repayment thereof, 
1861", 24 Vic. cap. 14. 
38 WO 33/42, Report of a commission appointed to consider measures necessary 
to abolish savings banks, 17 October 1883. 
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to the United States which the 93rd Regiment initially experienced with 
the creation of a savings bank proved to be no more than a temporary 
respite in the steady haemorrhage of manpower, and was perhaps attribut-
able to other causes. 39 More appropriately, such minor, piecemeal reforms 
should be viewed as particular examples in the continuing, if intermittent, 
process of improving the conditions of army life in the light of shifting 
military interests and the "march of mind". Within this perspective the 
effects of individual measures were bound to be cumulative, gradual, and 
long term. 
Throughout these years military reformers received little assistance 
from the British public or parliament. Unfamiliar with the alien world of 
army life, the public held the common soldier in low esteem and displayed 
insufficient concern for his welfare to launch the kind of pressure groups 
whose campaigns for reform accomplished so much in civilian society. 
Parliament, for its part, complained perennially about the size and cost of 
the army , but, beyond a periodic debate on corporal punishment, evinced 
a minimal interest in the common soldier in peacetime. Without the 
backing of an active, concerned public opinion, military reformers, whether 
paternalistic officers or administrators at the War Office, had to struggle as 
best they could against the forces of military traditionalism and bureau-
cratic inertia. On occasion, as in the case of regimental savings banks, they 
could through sheer doggedness and an appeal to considerations of eco-
nomy or improved discipline achieve small victories. In the absence of 
some countervailing force to conservatism and complacency, or of a 
thoroughgoing overhaul of army administration, however, individual 
reformers who tried, in the years between Waterloo and the Crimea, to 
adapt the army's institutions and conditions of service to the more enlight-
ened spirit of the age had to be satisfied with limited, tactical successes 
in an unremitting campaign. 
RESUME. 
Bien qu' elle flit une institution marquee d' autoritarisme et d' ordre hierarchi-
que, largement ii l'ecart des influences de Ia societe civile , l'armee britannique 
au debut de I' ere victorienne n' eta it cependant pas tout ii fait refractaire aux 
courants reformateurs et philanthropiques du temps . L 'etablissement de caisses 
d' epargne regimentaires constitue un exemple interessant de reformes militaires 
encouragees par des officiers paternalistes et des administrateurs eclaires au 
Ministere des Armees, qui se penchaient sur les vertus d'epargne , de sobriete, 
et le bien-etre de Ia troupe . Pour faire echec au traditionalisme invetere des 
autorites militaires, on fit valoir que les caisses d' epargne pourraient contribuer 
au recut de /'indiscipline , l'ivrognerie et Ia desertion chez les soldats britanniques. 
39 Arthur to Eden, 24 August 1840, in The Arthur Papers , III : 115 ; Public Record 
Office , Sir William Eyre Papers, 30/46/16, 21, report on desertion in Canada by E. A. 
Wetherall, deputy adjutant general, Montreal, 20 March 1845, encl. in Rowan to Brown, 
25 January 1851 ; J. E. ALEXANDER, "On Desertion in Canada", United Service Magazine , 
XXXIX (1842, Part 2) : 469-76. 
